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RELATIVE WEALTH CONCERNS WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION AND
HETEROGENEOUS PRIORS
CHAO DENG, XIZHI SU AND CHAO ZHOU
Abstract. We establish a Nash equilibrium in a market with N agents with the performance
criteria of relative wealth level when the market return is unobservable. Each investor has a
random prior belief on the return rate of the risky asset. The investors can be heterogeneous
in both the mean and variance of the prior. By a separation result and a martingale argument,
we show that the optimal investment strategy under a stochastic return rate model can be char-
acterized by a fully-coupled linear FBSDE. Two sets of deep neural networks are used for the
numerical computation to first find each investor’s estimate of the mean return rate and then
solve the FBSDEs. We establish the existence and uniqueness result for the class of FBSDEs
with stochastic coefficients and solve the utility game under partial information using deep neu-
ral network function approximators. We demonstrate the efficiency and accuracy by a base-case
comparison with the solution from the finite difference scheme in the linear case and apply the
algorithm to the general case of nonlinear hidden variable process. Simulations of investment
strategies show a herd effect that investors trade more aggressively under relativeness concerns.
Statistical properties of the investment strategies and the portfolio performance, including the
Sharpe ratios and the Variance Risk ratios (VRRs) are examed. We observe that the agent
with the most accurate prior estimate is likely to lead the herd, and the effect of competition on
heterogeneous agents varies more with market characteristics compared to the homogeneous case.
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neural networks.
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2 CHAO DENG, XIZHI SU AND CHAO ZHOU
1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the theory of both portfolio optimization under partial information and
the relative wealth criteria and of forward backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs for
short). For the former, we establish a system of stochastic equations with the solution corresponding
to the value function and the optimal control. The information is updated by a general filter, which
could be nonlinear. We show the uniqueness of the solution to the fully coupled multi-dimensional
FBSDE under certain assumption on the boundedness of the generator coefficients. We are the first
to use the deep learning method to solve for the portfolio allocation strategy for a utility game,
and explicitly exam the strategies under various of market conditions, investor’s risk preferences
and the informational hetegegeneity. In combination with martingale approach, the deep learning
algorithm explores the structural features of the controlled process. On the theoretical aspect,
we are the first to use the variational FBSDE in the multi-dimensional case to solve for the N-
equation system that characterizes the Nash equilibrium for the utility game. This transformation
motivates future applications to analyzes of coupled systems such as the mean field game under a
general non-Markovian setting. Simulation of the optimal portfoliio and the wealth process reveals
novel insights on the both the effect of information heterogeneity under the relativeness utility. The
investors interact through competiton, and the investor with the most accurate information is likely
to be the leader.
In practice, a fund can use the market average as a benchmark and measure its performance by
how much it overperforms. This is the case of an investment with competition. We also refer to
information incompeletenss as partial information. Our market consists of a risk-free bond and d
stocks, S = (S1, ..., Sd), for some integer d < ∞. For simplicity, we assume the risk-free interest
r = 0. The stock prices are continuous processes adapted to the filtration Ft on a filtered probability
space (Ω, (Ft)t≤T ,P). Each stock Si has a return rate that depends on the stock fundamentals,
modeled by a hidden variable At ∈ C([0, T ],Rl). W and B are independent standard Brownian
motions adapted to F , with W ∈ C([0, T ],Rd) and B ∈ C([0, T ],Rl) for an integer l < ∞. The
stock processes and hidden variable processes have the following dynamics:
dSit
Sit
= hi(At)dt+
d∑
j=1
σijw dW
j
t +
l∑
j=1
σijh dB
j
t (observed),(1.1)
dAt = µ(At)dt+m(At)dBt (hidden),(1.2)
where the initial condition to the stochastic differential equation (SDE) (1.2), denoted by A0, is
also unobserved and independent of the Brownian motions W and B. The coefficients h(a), µ(a)
and m(a) are C1 and Lipschitz continuous. These conditions ensure the existence and uniqueness
of strong solution to the above SDEs. The dependence of stock returns on the hidden variable At
is through the function h(a). We further assume the diffusion coefficient is positive definite and
uniform elliptic.
The observable filtration is the one generated by the stock prices. We denote by FSt for the
σ-algebra generated by (Su)u≤t. Clearly, FS ⊂ F . In the following discussion, we abbreviate hit for
hi(At), and write hˆ
i
t = E
[
hi(At)|FSt
]
. Each investor is aware of the model of the hidden variable
and the stock prices. Her initial belief on the distribution of return is a normally distributed random
variable, which we denote by hˆi(A0) ∼ N(mi, vi) if investor i’s initial belief is normal with mean
mi and variance vi.
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To write stock prices under partial information in a complete market form, define the innovation
process as
νit =
∫ t
0
(
dSiu
Siu
− hˆiudu
)
= σiζit ,
where ζit is an FSt -adapted standard Brownian motion.
With the total variance,
σ =
(
σwσ
⊺
w + σhσ
⊺
h
)1/2
.
The stock dynamic (1.1) can be written as
dSt
St
= hˆtdt+ σdζt.
The objective of an individual investor or a fund manager is to find a portfolio allocation strategy
over available assets such that it maximizes the expected utility, which depends on the wealth
amount that exceeds the average of all investors at terminal time T . The investors are of CARA
type, mathematically, the utility function is
(1.3) U i(X iT , XT ) = −e−
1
δi
(
XiT−θ
iXT
)
, where XT =
1
N
N∑
k=1
XkT .
The parameters δi > 0 and θi ∈ [0, 1] represent the i-th agent’s absolute risk tolerance and competi-
tion weight. A high value of δ implies a high risk tolerance which, in general, induces an aggressive
investment strategy. The case θ = 0 corresponds to an investor with no relative wealth concern.
We adopt the convention for CARA utility to denote the dollar amount of investment by πt ∈ Rd.
We aim to identify a Nash equilibrium pi∗ = (πi,∗t , ...π
N,∗
t )t∈[0,T ]. The strategy is optimal in the
sense that no one is better-off by unilaterally deviating from it. When the return process is linear
Gaussian, we can derive the dynamics of estimated return rate, then use the PDE approach to solve
the investor’s problem. The value function depends on the Markovian state variables that consist of
the investor’s wealth and the estimated return rate. We then derive an HJB equation for the value
function. For exponential utility, we can reduce the dimension of the PDE. The resulting PDE only
depends on the spacial variable hˆt. In other words, increasing the number of agents in the game does
not increase the dimension of the problem. We obtain an analytical solution of the value function,
hence the equilibrium strategy. The strategies of all investors can be solved through a linear system
whose coefficients depend on risk preferences, observable market parameters, estimates of market
returns, and the investment horizon.
BSDE is an essential tool for the problem of a single investor under partial information. In the
case of a nonlinear hidden variable process, the mean return cannot be written as a deterministic
function of any finite-dimensional state. Therefore, the control problem is non-Markovian. Using
a non-standard martingale representation theorem, we can write an FS- adapted martingale as a
stochastic integral against the innovation process. We derived a non-Markovian one-dimensional
BSDE similar to the one in [24]. Combining the one-dimensional BSDE derived for the single-agent
problem, we obtain a multi-dimensional fully coupled FBSDE, by which the terminal condition for
the unidimensional BSDE is endogeneously determined.
The Nash equilibrium is unique under certain assumptions on the market parameters and risk
preferences. The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from the uniqueness of the FBSDE solution.
Since the return parameter in the FBSDE comes from estimation, it is bounded if the investor has
prior knowledge about the range of the true return process. Under this assumption, the generator
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f is linear and Lipschitz, so are the drift and volatility of the forward wealth process, which we
denoted by g(t, ·) and σ(t, ·), respectively. We show the uniqueness of the solution for fully coupled
FBSDE in this case. Furthermore, since σ(t, ·) can be degenerate, many of the existing results for
the well-posedness of FBSDEs do not apply. However, observe an important feature of this FBSDE,
that the forward equation does not depend on the Y component of the backward equation. We can
apply the main theorem in [52] to establish the uniqueness and existence of the solution.
We numerically solve this multi-dimensional FBSDE by a deep learning method. The numerical
scheme is conducted in two stages. In Stage I, we estimate the stock returns using an L2 projection.
The recurrent neural network (RNN) is used in order to exploit the time series feature of the input
to facilitate the sequential learning. The RNN first produces the hidden state, which will be
transformed by a linear map to the final output corresponding to the estimation at each discrete
time step. The RNN as a function approximator takes the stock paths from time 0 up to time
T , as well as the investor’s initial belief as the input. However, the estimation at each time step
depends only on the past stock prices and the investor’s initial belief. The estimated return process
appears in the drift and diffusion terms of the forward equation and the generator of the backward
equation. In Stage II, we solve the FBSDE, again using neural networks as function approximators.
The algorithm in this step is similar to [18]. The FBSDE coupling requires no extra care in designing
the neural network structure. However, the loss function must include a terminal condition that is a
function of the wealth process, which is also computed from the NN parameters. We denote by the
terminal loss for the difference between the parametrized function and the forward simulation at
the terminal time. Experiments of the deep learning scheme on different sets of model parameters
show the efficiency and robustness of our method. The deep learning method is flexible in that it
allows the nonlinear type of filters. Moreover, deep learning can be easily adapted to multi-asset
cases where most numerical scheme fails due to the explosion of the number of grids as the problem
dimension grows, also known as the curse of dimensionality.
Investment strategies are compared through time series statistics. With our choice of market
and risk parameters, in the linear Gaussian case, the standard deviations of the absolute value of
the investment strategy are larger when with full information. Competition increases the mean and
the standard deviation. We also compute the coefficient of variation (CV) as the ratio between the
Std and the Mean. On average of three agents, competition does not change the CV significantly,
which means the increase of the volatility of the investment strategy mainly attributes to the
increase of the value itself but not the variation cross time. The Sharpe ratio and VRR further
illustrates the performance of the optimal strategies for the utility game. In case of nonlinear filters,
we found that the CV is significantly smaller under partial information for the three sets market
parameters, indicating the strategies is less volatile when the investors estimate returns from the
market. Competition may reduce the average CV. The numerical results are presented in section
6.
Comparing the case with linear and nonlinear filter, we observe that the agent with the most
accurate prior estimate is likely to lead the herd, and the effect of competition on heterogeneous
agents varies more with market characteristics. More generally, agent heterogeneity exploits market
properties. This finding provides extra reasons why we introduce the information heterogeneity with
agents’ interactions into the portfolio model.
1.1. Literature review. Competition among fund managers stemmed from various incentives,
from career advances motives to purpose of seeking clients. The empirical works [8], [2] and [9]
have documented the phenomenoen. However, competitions among a group of more than two
managers have hardly be considered. Studies have also shown the importance of relative concerns
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in financial economics, including [1], where the utility is one of the relative consumption levels.
With a time-separable utility function, [21] shows that the Joneses behavior yields portfolio bias
when the agents face non-diversifiable risks. [16] examed empirical implications of the relative
wealth concerns, providing an explanation to the finanical bubble. The work [5] analyzed the
effect of social interactions when a market derivative is traded to share the risk among investors
with relative performance concerns. The above works yield the herd effect by risk sharing motives
or relative utilities. A recent work that includes the private information into the model is [43].
It analyzed the informative trading of managers and the implications on the efficiency of asset
prices using an one-period mean-variance criteria. The focus is on the price informativeness with
different information structures. Our focus is on the dynamic investment strategy with information
heterogeneous agents and therefore different from it.
The optimal investment problem was initiated by Merton in 1970s [38] as part of the asset pricing
theory. A mass body of literatures have been developed since then. Classicial works include [42],
[27], and [12], among others. Duality approach was developed in [29] and [45] and has become a
useful tool to solve incomplete market model, with [39] a recent application with partial information.
Problems with portfolio constraints was in [13] and [51], among others. For other models with
market frictions, the transaction cost case was considered in [35], [15], and [48]. [14] first studied
portfolio problem with both transaction costs and position limits.
The paper [30] used the PDE approach to solve an N-agent game. They established a Nash
equilibrium under which all agents maximize their utilities with relative performance concerns for
a varity of standard time-separable utility functions. The HJB equation can be derived when
the agents are of CARA or the CRRA type. However, the PDE method has its limitations. It is
restricted to the case of the deterministic mean return process and may fail in our market model with
partial information and information filtering. The idiosyncratic noise is specific for the individual
stocks that is only available for a particular agent. In our model, the same set of stocks driven by
the common noise are available to all agents. Our model can be modified without much difficulty
to accomodate the case where the stocks are driven by the common noise, but agent i only invests
in stocks i with return bi and stock price Si.
Initial works on consumption-portfolio choice and asset pricing under partial information include
[20]. The separation principle holds in the linear Gaussian setting - the investor’s optimal decision is
equivalent to that of first estimate and then optimize. The HJB equation for the optimization step
involves the estimated return as a new state variable. An early work [17] derived the equilibrium
asset price, while symmetric information was assumed. [4] built an asset pricing model with investors
of heterogeneous beliefs, although the agents do not interact through the utility game as in our
model.
Based on a martingale representation theorem, [28] reduced the partial information portfolio
optimization problem into a complete market problem. With linear Gaussian filtering, partial
information was studied in [7] where the loss of utility due to incomplete information was quantified.
Partial information is also seen in [31] for optimization of pair trade strategies, and [49] for recursive
optimization. [41] used martingales and duality theory to the case of stochastic volatility, although
without explicitly solving the optimal strategy.
For information models, the nonlinear filter was less considered than the linear one. Wonham
filter is used to estimate the states of a Markov chain. [44] and [47] studied partial information
with regime switching, with [44] using the PDE approach and [47] using the martingale approach.
The latter is in fact more general since it allows stochastic interest rates and multiple assets.
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[36] considered the exponential utiity under partial information in a general semi-martingale
framework where the available information is part of the filtration generating the stock prices. It
shows the equivalence to a new optimization problem formulated by the observable processes. By
reducing to complete market case, [6] solved explicitly optimal strategies for various utility functions
under partial information. In addition to the Merton proportion, the strategy includes a hedging
demand for the volatility of the return process. [39] used results from filtering, duality, and the
BSDE theory to solve the investment problem, which includes the case of an unbounded mean
return. It argues that the BSDE solution is the unique limit of solutions to a sequence of truncated
problems with unique solutions obtained by a martingale representation theorem. In our model,
extra difficulty arises due to the FBSDE coupling, and a uniqueness result for unbounded returns
in the general setting could not be obtained similarly.
The work [40] established a correspondence between the path-dependent HJB equations and
non-Markovian control problems. The technique of using BSDE to solve the portfolio maximization
problem was first introduced by [46] and further developed by [24]. Both works consider the portfolio
problem by indifference pricing for a contingent claim. More recently, [37] applied BSDE approach
to the robust utility maximization, and second-order BSDEs to the robust problem under volatility
uncertainty.
Compared to BSDEs, the theory of coupled FBSDE was developed more recently. Antonelli [3]
first obtained the result on the solvability of an FBSDE over a “small” time duration. Later, the
Four Step Scheme in [33] and the Method of Continuation in [25] and [50] were used to establish the
well-posedness result on an arbitrary time duration. The main result used in this paper is from [52],
which covers the cases of the fully-coupled equation with a degenerate diffusion coefficient. Classical
methods for solving the BSDEs includes the Monte Carolo method. More recently, [18] introduced
a numerical method using the deep neural networks (NNs). The neural networks approximate the
conditional expectations after time-discretization. [22] proved the theoretical convergence of the
deep learning (DL) algorithm for the coupled FBSDEs using properties of the discretized equa-
tions. A backward scheme that also treats the deep neural networks as function approximators
was developed in [26], where theoretical convergence of the numerical scheme was also shown. A
deep NN based method to solve the mean field game (MFG) is in [10] and [11], respectively for
the ergodic and the finite horizon case. A systematic study of the performance of the DL method
for solving (F)BSDEs with varying hyperparameters and network structures is yet missing, much
less is the convergence and the stability the optimization with stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
In our paper, the solution to the FBSDE is unique, hence we regard the loss value as an indicator
of the training accuracy, and the convergence is justified by the theoretical features of the FBSDE
and the empirical success of the DL algorithm.
Using a martingale approach, [24] derived BSDEs for investors with portfolio constraints when
return is stochastic and uniformly bounded. Due to the boundedness of coefficients, the existence
and uniqueness result is classical. [19] studied an investment problem with relative performance
concerns and the argument relies on [24]. The paper identified the market average as the payoff of
a contingent claim and solves it in the utility indifference pricing framework. The generator was
quadratic due to the portfolio constraint. For deterministic mean returns, they were able to derive
an analytical solution for the N-agent equilibrium and show the solution exists by verification. The
uniqueness result for stochastic coefficients is not available since the FBSDE was fully coupled with
quadratic generators. In our model, the equation is simplier with linear coefficients.
The following table summarizes the works and correponding methods mentioned above that are
the most closely related to this paper.
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Table 1. Comparison of works
Paper Hu, Imekeller, Muller Espinosa, Touzi Zariphopoulou, Lacker This paper
Utility exponential, power, log general utilities exponential, power, log exponential
Game No Yes Yes Yes
Class of return process Stochastic Deterministic Deterministic Stochastic
Main method BSDE FBSDE PDE FBSDE
Analytical solution No Yes Yes No
Adapt to portfolio constraints Yes Yes No Yes
Numerical solution No Yes Yes Yes
Learning No No No Yes
2. Market model and the control problem
2.1. Preliminaries on market model. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume
that risk-free interest rate r = 0. The price dynamics for stock i is
dSit
Sit
= hi(At)dt+
d∑
j=1
σijw dW
j
t +
l∑
j=1
σijh dB
j
t ,(2.1)
for i ∈ {1, ..., d}. σw ∈ Rd×d and σh ∈ Rd×l are constants. The Browian motions W and B are
R
d-valued and Rl-valued, respectively and independent of each other. The functions hi are R-valued
whose forms are to be specified.
Following the partial information model in [39], we consider two classes of filters. Recall that the
relation between asset return rate and the hidden variable is specified by the function h(a). The
following examples considers different dimensionality of the hidden variable At.
Example 1 (Multi-dimensional case). Suppose At is R
dL-valued. h(At) is linear in At. Suppose
At follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process that reverts to a constant µ¯ ∈ RdL :
(2.2) dAt = −λ(At − µ¯)dt+ σadBt,
where µ¯ ∈ RdL , σa ∈ RdL×l and B is the l-dimensional standard Brownian motion. The function h
is linear with h(a) = (wL)Ta+ cL for wL in Rd
L
and cL ∈ R. Based on the stock prices, investors
update beliefs according to a Kalman filter (KF)1.
Our framework of FBSDE is general enough to include the class of nonlinear filters, as in the
following examples:
Example 2 (One-dimensional case).
dAt = −λ(At − µ¯)dt+ σa
√
(At − al)(au −At)dBt.(2.3)
Remark 1. In the above dynamic, At is essentially bounded between al and au.
Example 3 (One-dimensional case). The hidden variable At follows the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross
(CIR) process that is mean reverting to µ¯:
(2.4) dAt = −λ(At − µ¯)dt+ σa
√
AtdBt.
For the following discussion, |·| denotes the Euclidean norm in Rm, m ∈ N. For p > 0, Lp denotes
the set of FT measurable random variables F such that E[|F |p] <∞. For k ∈ N, Hk(Rd) deonotes
1Refer to [32] for a general theory of Kalman-Bucy filter.
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the set of all Rd-valued stochastic processes φ that are predictable with respect to F and such
that E[
∫ T
0 |φ|k] < ∞. H∞(Rd) is the set of all F-predictable Rd-valued processes that are λ
⊗
P-
a.e. bounded on [0, T ]× Ω, where λ is Lebesgue measure on R. Denote E(X) for the exponential
martingale of X .
Recall that for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the process πjt is the dollar amount invested in stock j at time t. The
number of shares to hold for stock j is therefore
πjt
Sjt
.
Assumption 1. (Uniformly elliptic) The total variance σσ⊺ is bounded, i.e,
(2.5)
1
ǫ
≤ σσ⊺ ≤ ǫ <∞.
for some positive definite matrix ǫ.
Condition 1 (Novikov). The process ht, t ∈ [0, T ] satisfies the Novikov condition:
(2.6) E
[
e
1
2ǫh
∫
T
0
||ht||
2dt
]
<∞.
for some small constant ǫh.
Remark 2. By ht = h(At), the Novikov condition is satisfied if h(a) is a square-root or power
function and At is essentially bounded. By Jensen’s inequality,
E
[
e
∫
T
0
1
2ǫh
‖hˆt‖
2dt
]
≤ 1
T
∫ T
0
Ee
T
2ǫh
‖ht‖
2
dt.
Hence, given the right-hand side is finite, all moments of the estimated return process are bounded.
2.2. Objective function under relative wealth concerns. We consider the market with N
investors, each with the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), or the exponential risk preference.
Investors are concerned about their performances valued by the wealth relative to the average of
market investors at a future time T . The market average is modeled by a random payoff at the
terminal time in the utility function. Denote by Xt the average wealth of investors at time t, and
X i0 = x
i ∈ R the i-th investor’s initial wealth. Since we refer the problem as an N-agent utility
game, we use the word agent and investors interchangeably in this paper.
The relative utility function for the CARA investor i is
U i(X iT , XT ) = −e−
1
δi
(
XiT−θ
iXT
)
, where XT =
1
N
N∑
k=1
XkT .
The objective function for an arbitrary investor with the risk parameter (δ, θ) and wealth at time
t, Xt is
(2.7) J(t, π1, ..., πN ) = E
[
−e− 1δ (XT−θXT )
]
.
where δ > 0 is the personal risk tolerance. θ ∈ [0, 1] is the investor’s competition weight parameter.
In the following discussion, the superscript i indicates variables for investor i.
Write X˜ it =
1
N
∑
j 6=iX
j
t . By simple algebra, the objective can be written as
J(t, π1, ..., πN ) = E
[
−e− 1δi
(
(1− θ
i
N
)XiT−θ
iX˜iT
)]
(2.8)
= E
[
−e− 1δi
(
1− θ
i
N
)(
XiT−
Nθi
N−θi X˜
i
T
)]
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The value function for agent i with initial wealth xi is
(2.9) V (0, xi) = sup
πi∈Ai
E
[
−e− 1δi
(
1− θ
i
N
)(
XiT−
Nθi
N−θi X˜
i
T
)]
.
Admissible set. The set of admissible strategies Ai for agent i is the set of all predictable processes
π = (πt)0≤t≤T such that (1) E
[∫ T
0
|πtσ|2
]
<∞. (2) The set{
e±X
i,π
τ : τ is a stopping time with value in [0, T ]
}
is uniformly bounded in Lq(P) for all q > 0.
We define the Nash equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). A vector (π1,∗, ..., πN,∗) of admissible strategies is a Nash equi-
librium if, for all πi ∈ Ai, i ∈ {1, ..., N},
Ji(π
1,∗, ..., πi,∗, ..., πN,∗) ≥ Ji(π1,∗, ..., πi, ..., πN,∗).
3. Nash equilibrium by FBSDE
For presentation simplicity, we set d = 1 for the rest of the discussion. The analysis would adapt
to the multiple common stocks case with purely notational change. See remark 3 for more details.
3.1. Formal derivation of FBSDE. Recall that when the terminal condition and bt :=
ht
σ are
bounded, [24] has shown that the investor’s value function and optimal strategy (without constraint)
correspond to the solution (Yt, Zt) of the following BSDE:
(3.1) Yt = F −
∫ T
t
ZsdWs −
∫ T
t
f(s, Zs)ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
with the generator
(3.2) f(·, z) = zbt + δ
2
|bt|2.
and some bounded random variable F that is the terminal condition of the BSDE.
The optimal strategy is given by
π∗t =
p∗t
σ
,
where p∗t is linear in the Zt component in the BSDE solution,
(3.3) p∗t = Zt + δbt, t ∈ [0, T ].
The value function at the initial time is given by
(3.4) V (x) = −e− 1δ (x−Y0).
We now formulate the optimization problem under the relative performance criteria. The random
variable F represents the benchmark market average at terminal time. The constant αi captures
the risk preference and competition concern of the i-th investor. More explicitly, take F = NθN−θ X˜T ,
and 1δ =
1
δi
(
1− θiN
)
in (3.1) and (3.2) , we obtain the objective function for the i-th investor.
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Suppose all agents adopt the strategies corresponding to p∗, we can write explicitly the wealth
process of agent i in terms of Zit and estimated market parameters,
X it = x
i +
∫ t
0
σ−1pi,∗u
dSu
Su
(3.5)
= xi +
∫ t
0
(
Ziu + δbu
)( hˆu
σu
du+ dζu
)
.
Since X i may be unbounded, the terminal condition F does not satisfy the condition in [24].
Therefore, the correspondence between our optimization problem and the above BSDE is not im-
mediate. We will show that under certain integrable conditions on the return rate, the solution to
a single agent’s investment problem is still characterized by the BSDE (3.1).
To write the system of BSDEs corresponding to each investor as a multi-dimensional equation,
we introduce the vector notation:
X =
(
X i
)
i∈{1,...,N}
(3.6)
where X i is for an arbitrary random variable that corresponds to the investor i.
We introduce a matrix notation to compute the performance benchmark of the wealth amount.
F = AXT ,(3.7)
where A is an N-by-N matrix that does both averaging and taking into account the relative concern
of a particular agent. To be more specific,
(3.8) A =


0 θ1N−θ1 . . .
θ1
N−θ1
θ2
N−θ2
0 . . . θ2N−θ2
...
...
. . .
...
θN
N−θN
θN
N−θN
. . . 0

 .
From now on, let f operates on z componentwise, and let ◦ denote the componentwise multipli-
cation. If all agents solve the optimization problem, we can write
f(·, z) = z ◦ bt + δ
2
|bt|2.(3.9)
Notice that if bt is bounded, then f is Lipschitz.
The above derivation suggests that any Nash equilibrium strategy for N agents with relative
performance corresponds to the following multi-dimensional FBSDE:
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
(
Zs ◦ bs + δ|bs|2
)
ds+
∫ t
0
(Zs + δbs) ◦ dζs,(3.10)
Yt = AXT −
∫ T
t
Zs ◦ dζs −
∫ T
t
f(s,Zs)ds,(3.11)
where Zs ◦ dζs =
(
Zisdζ
i
s
)⊺
i∈{1,...,N}
.
Remark 3. As was previously mentioned, in the present setting, agents invest in the same set of
stocks. Hence all components of b and ζ are identical. In case agent i invests in stock i while all
the stocks are still driven by the common noise, the components of b and the Brownian motion ζ
will depend on the agent i’s individual stock.
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Theorem 1. Suppose the return rate satisfies the Novikov condition. Let hˆit = hˆ(At) be the
estimated mean return of the i-th agent. If there exists a solution (Yt, Zt) to the FBSDE (3.10
- 3.11), then there is a Nash equilibrium strategy pi∗ = (π1,∗, ..., πN,∗) given by
(3.12) pi∗ = σ−1
(
Zt +
δ
bt
)
.
In order to construct the investment strategy by the martingale approach under the observable
filtration, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Every martingale in Fζ is a martingale in FS .
Proof. Let M be a Fζ-martingale. By a martingale representation theorem in [6], the martingale
MSt = E
[
MT |FSt
]
has a unique representation:
(3.13) MSt = E[MT ] +
∫ t
0
MSu σ
M
u dζu.
Since MSt is also a stochastic integral against ζt, it is a martingale under Fζt . Alternatively, we can
write it as
(3.14) MSt = E
[
MT |Fζt
]
=Mt.
Since MS is a FS-martingale, so is M . 
We next prove that the solution to the FBSDE we constructed is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
The above lemma is used to show the martingale we will later construct is in a larger filtration FS
than Fζ . From now on, we omit the super(sub)-script i when there is no ambiguity.
Proof. We first show the solution to the unidimensional BSDE is the value function for a single
agent’s investment problem with terminal payoff F = NθN−θ X˜T .
For investor i, following the proof in [24], first define a strategy p ∈ A by
(3.15) R
(p)
t := −e−
1
δ
(X
(p)
t −Yt), t ∈ [0, T ],
where Yt is a component of the solution to the unidimensional BSDE
(3.16) Yt = F −
∫ T
t
Zsdζs −
∫ T
t
f(s, Zs)ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
Define
M
(p)
t := −e−
1
δ
(x−Y0)E
(
−1
δ
∫ t
0
(ps − Zs)dζs
)
.
which is a local martingale in Fζ .
For
C
(p)
t := e
− 1
δ
∫
t
0 (bsps−f(s,Zs)−
δ
2|ps−Zs|
2)ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
we have
R
(p)
t =M
(p)
t C
(p)
t .
For R
(p)
t to be a local martingale for some p
∗ and a supermartingale for all p ∈ A, we need C(p)t
decreasing and C
(p∗)
t = 1, µL
⊗
P-a.s. for µL the Lebesgue measure on R and some p
∗.
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The exponent of C
(p)
t is a quadratic function in p. Optimization yields,
(3.17) f(·, z) = zbt + δ
2
|bt|2 ,
and
(3.18) p∗t = Zt + δbt, t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence C
(p∗)
t = 1 and R
(p∗)
t =M
(p∗)
t is a local martingale in Fζ .
Since bt satisfies the Novikov condition,M
(p∗)
t and hence R
(p∗)
t are true martingales. The Novikov
condition of bt also implies that R
(p∗)
t is uniformly integrable. Hence, R
(p∗)
τ is uniformly bounded
in Lq(P), which implies that the strategy p∗t is admissible.
It remains to show that R(p) is a supermartingle for all p ∈ A under FS . Since the process
M
(p)
t is a local martingale in Fζ , there exists a sequence of stopping times (τn)n∈N such that
lim
n→∞
τn = T, P-a.s. and (Mt∧τn)t∈[0,T ] is a positive Fζ-martingale for each n ∈ N. By Lemma 1,
they are FS-martingales. The process C˜(p) is decreasing. Thus R(p)t∧τn is a FS-supermartingale for
each n. That is, for s ≤ t,
E
[
R
(p)
t∧τn |FSs
]
≤ R(p)s∧τn .
Equivalently, for any set U ∈ FS , we have
E
[
R
(p)
t∧τn1U
]
≤ E
[
R
(p)
s∧τn1U
]
.
Notice that the admissible condition implies that eXτ is uniformly bounded in Lq(P). By the
forward equation for X , we have
e
∫
τ
0
(Zsbsds+Zsdζs) = eXτ−x0−
∫
τ
0
δ|bs|
2ds−
∫
τ
0
δbsdζs = eXτ · e−x0−
∫
τ
0
δ|bs|
2ds−
∫
τ
0
δbsdζs
is uniformly bounded in Lq(P).
Furthermore, the solution for the backward equation Y has∣∣∣eYτ ∣∣∣q = ‖eY0+∫ τ0 Zsdζs+∫ τ0 (Zsbs+ δ2|bs|2)ds‖q
≤ eqC0Y0 · eqC1
∫
τ
0
(Zsdζs+Zsbsds) · eqC2
∫
τ
0
δ
2|bs|
2ds <∞.
Therefore, eYτ is uniformly bounded in Lq(P).
The process R
(p)
τ is a constant multiple of the product of e−
1
δ
X(p)τ and e
1
δ
Yτ . Combining the
definition of admissiblility and the above argument, we have
(3.19) E[eqR
(p)
τ ] ≤ CE[e−r 1δX(p)τ ]E[er′ 1δYτ ] <∞
where r = 1+q2 and
1
r +
1
r′ =
1
q .
we have
{
R
(p)
t∧tn
}
n
and
{
R
(p)
s∧tn
}
n
are uniformly bounded in Lq(P) over n for all q > 0. Letting
n→∞, we obtain
E
[
R
(p)
t 1U
]
≤ E
[
R(p)s 1U
]
,
which implies the supermartingale property of R(p) as claimed. 
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3.2. Explicit solution in case of linear filters. In this section, we derive a PDE solution for
linear Gaussian filters. Consider a model with the following stock dynamics, which corresponds to
d = 1, h(a) = a, σw = σS
√
1− ρ2 and σh = σSρ, µ(a) = −λ(a− µ¯), m(a) = σµ in (1.1) - (1.2),
dSt
St
= Atdt+ σS
(√
1− ρ2dWt + ρdBt
)
,(3.20)
dAt = −λ(At − µ¯)dt+ σµdBt, t ∈ [0, T ].(3.21)
In the following discussion, we adopt the notation hˆt = hˆ(At) = E[h(At)
∣∣FSt ∨hˆ(A0)]. From filtering
theory, the innovation process
(3.22) νt =
∫ t
0
(
dSu
Su
− hˆudu
)
is a scaled Brownian motion under FSt , i.e, ζt = σ−1ν(t) is a standard Brownian motion under FSt .
With the estimated return rate and the Brownian motion in a smaller filtration, the asset price
can be regarded as one in the complete market. The price evolves as
dSt
St
= Aˆtdt+ σSdζt,
where the stochastic term is an FSt adapted Brownian motion ζt.
We use the notation Σ(t) to indicate Σ is a deterministic function of t. By the filtering theory,
(3.23) dAˆt = −λ(Aˆt − µ¯)dt+
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σS
)
dζt,
with Aˆ0 ∼ N(η0, Σˆ(0)). In addition, the conditional variance Σˆ(t) = E
[
(At − Aˆt)2
∣∣FSt ∨ Aˆ0]
satisfies a Riccati ODE, with analytical solution
(3.24) Σˆ(t) = Σˆ(t; Σ0) =
√
kσS
k1e
2
√
k
σS
t
+ k2
k1e
2
√
k
σS
t − k2
−
(
λ+
σµρ
σS
)
σ2S .
The constants k, k1 and k2 are
k = λ2σ2S + 2σSσµλρ+ σ
2
µ,
k1 =
√
kσS + (λσ
2
S + σSσµρ) + Σ0,
k2 = −
√
kσS + (λσ
2
S + σSσµρ) + Σ0.
Let (αit)t∈[0,T ], i ∈ {1, ..., N} be an investment strategy among N investors. For the investor i,
denote the competitor’s average by α−i, where q−it =
1
N
∑
j 6=i q
j
t for arbitrary process qt.
dX it = π
i
tAˆ
i
tdt+ π
i
tσdζt,
dX˜ it = (αtAˆt)
−idt+ α−it σdζt.
We can derive a PDE for V (t, x, y, η) = sup
π∈A
E
[
J(t)
∣∣Xt = x, X˜t = y, µˆt = η] and obtain the fol-
lowing results for the optimal strategy of the investors, from which we can compute the value
function of each investor. We include the explicit expression for the value function in the appendix
to save the space.
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Theorem 2. The stock return rate satisfies the condition 1. δi > 0, θi ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ {1, ..., N},
and define wi2 =
δi
θi , the investor i’s estimate of return is η
i, i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Then there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium strategy among investors.
Define the following constants depending on i,
m
i =
δi
σ2S(1− θ
i
N )
{
1
σ2S
wi2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)∫ T
t
e
−
∫
s
t
(
λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
du
·
∫ s
t
(
Σˆ(u) + σSσµρ
)
e
−
∫
s
u
(
λ+
2(Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ)
σS
−
Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
dm
duds+
θi
1− θiN
}
,
and
βi =
δi
σ2S
(
1− θiN
){ηi + (Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ)
∫ T
t
(
− 1
σ2S
)
e
−2
∫
s
t
(
λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σS
)
du
ηi
+
Σˆ(u) + σSσµρ
σ2S
∫ T
t
∫ s
t
λµ¯e
−
∫
s
u
(
λ+
2(Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ)
σS
−
Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
dm
du
· e−
∫
s
t
(
λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
du
ds
}
.
Let M be the matrix with the i-th row equals to miei, where (ei)j = 1 − δ{i=j}. The vector β with
the i-th component βi = β
i. Then, the optimal strategy pi∗ = (π∗,i)Ni=1 can be expressed in terms M
and β as
pi∗ =M−1β.
The detailed calculation is in the Appendix. Observe that the analytical solution includes all the
market parameters and risk preferences of all investors. In our numerical experiments, we set the
number of agents N = 3. Given Σˆ(0) ∈ R, we compute Σˆ(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], then compute M and
β by numerical integration. Agents can have identical or heterogeneous initial belief on the hidden
parameter. At each time step tk, instead of solving a linear system that involves a matrix inversion,
we iteratively solve for strategy αitk until α converges. The convergence is within 3 iterations at
each time step, and hence the method is efficient.
4. Existence and Uniqueness of the FBSDE solution
To establish the existence and uniqueness of the FBSDE solution, we need to make some as-
sumptions on the market parameters. Since the FBSDE is fully-coupled, we will first show that
the unique solution exists on a small time interval, then apply a pasting argument to get a unique
solution on an arbitrary time interval [0, T ].
Condition 2 (Competition parameters). Let La be the norm of matrix A (3.8),
La = sup
{
‖Ax‖2 : x ∈ RN with ‖x‖2 = 1
}
.
Suppose the following holds:
L2ae < 1,
where e denotes the natural number.
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Remark 4. We estimate the matrix norm as
L2a = ‖A‖22 ≤ ‖A‖1‖A‖∞ =

 N∑
i=1
θi
N − θi


(
max
i
θi(N − 1)
N − θi
)
≤

 N∑
i=1
θi
N − 1


(
max
i
θi(N − 1)
N − 1
)(4.1)
≤ max
i
(
θi
)2
.
So the condition is satisfied if maxi θ
i < e−0.5 ≈ 0.6. The moderate level of θi is a reasonable
assumption in view of the weak interaction in the existing literature [23].
Theorem 3. Assume Condition 2 and that (ht)t≤T is a bounded process. There exists a unique
solution to the FBSDE (3.11).
Proof. Suppose |bt| =
∣∣∣ hˆtσ ∣∣∣ ≤ b˜ ∈ R. We first show the solution exists on a small interval, i.e, there
exists a δb s.t for δc ≤ δb, the FBSDE has a unique solution on S2δc(RN ) × S2δc(RN ) ×H2δc(RN,d).
Denote
g(t, z) = zb+
1
α
|bt|2 ,(4.2)
σ(t, z) = z +
1
α
bt,(4.3)
f(t, z) = zb+
1
2α
|bt|2 .(4.4)
Let δh > 0 to be determined and δc ∈ (0, δh]. Let x ∈ RN be fixed. We introduce the following
norm
(4.5) ‖(Y, Z)‖N [0,δc] = sup
t∈[0,δc]
{
E|Yt|2 + E
∫ δc
t
|Zt|2 ds
}1/2
.
Let N [0, δc] be the completion of N [0, δc] in H2δc(RN )×H2δc(RN,d) under norm (4.5). Take any
(Y (i), Z(i)) ∈ N [0, δc], i = 1, 2, the SDE for X(i) is:
dX(i) = g(t, Z(i))dt+ σ(t, Z(i))dζt, t ∈ [0, δc],(4.6)
X
(i)
0 = x
(i).(4.7)
Since both g and σ are independent of x, the above SDE has a unique strong solution X(i) ∈
H2δc(R
N ). Apply Itoˆ’s formula to
∣∣∣X(1)t −X(2)t ∣∣∣2, we then obtain the following estimate:
E
∣∣∣X(1)t −X(2)t ∣∣∣2 = E
∫ t
0
(
2bs
∣∣∣X(1)s −X(2)s ∣∣∣∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣+∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2
)
ds
≤ E

∫ t
0
ǫ1
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds+
∫ t
0
b˜
2
ǫ1
∣∣∣X(1)s −X(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds+
∫ t
0
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds


for some constant ǫ1 > 1.
By Gronwall’s inequality, we have
(4.8) E
∣∣∣X(1)t −X(2)t ∣∣∣2 ≤ e 1ǫ1 ∫ δc0 b˜2dsE
∫ δc
0
(1 + ǫ1)
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds.
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Next, we solve the following BSDEs (i = 1, 2):
dY¯ (i) = f(t, Z¯(i))dt+ Z¯(i)dζt, t ∈ [0, δc],(4.9)
Y¯
(i)
δc
= AX
(i)
δc
.(4.10)
where X
(i)
δc
is simulated with process Y (i) and Z(i). Recall that we use A without the time index
to denote a constant matrix.
Applying results to BSDEs with random coefficients, we see that the BSDE (4.9) has a unique
adapted solution (Y¯ (i), Z¯(i)) ∈ N [0, δc] ⊂ N¯ [0, δc]. Define a map T : N [0, δc] → N [0, δc] by
(Y (i), Z(i)) 7→ (Y¯ (i), Z¯(i)). Apply Ito’s formula to
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)t − Y¯ (2)t ∣∣∣2, we have
E
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)t − Y¯ (2)t ∣∣∣2 +
∫ δc
t
∣∣∣Z¯(1)s − Z¯(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds
≤ L2aE
∣∣∣X(1)δc −X(2)δc
∣∣∣2 + ∫ δc
t
2bs
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)s − Y¯ (2)s ∣∣∣∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣ ds
≤ L2ae
1
ǫ1
∫
δc
0
|bs|
2ds
E
∫ δc
0
(1 + ǫ1)
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds+
∫ δc
t
2bs
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)s − Y¯ (2)s ∣∣∣∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣ ds
≤ L2ae
1
ǫ1
δc b˜
2
E
∫ δc
0
(1 + ǫ1)
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds+
∫ δc
t
b˜2
ǫ2
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)s − Y¯ (2)s ∣∣∣2 ds+ ǫ2
∫ δc
t
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds
where we used (4.8) in the second last inequality. Hence,
E
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)t − Y¯ (2)t ∣∣∣2 +
∫ δc
t
∣∣∣Z¯(1)s − Z¯(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds
≤ e 1ǫ2 δcb˜2
{[
ǫ2 + L
2
ae
1
ǫ1
δc b˜
2
(1 + ǫ1)
]
E
∫ δc
0
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds
}
+
b˜2
ǫ2
∫ δc
t
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)s − Y¯ (2)s ∣∣∣2 ds
≤ e 1ǫ2 δcb˜2
{[
ǫ2 + L
2
ae
1
ǫ1
δc b˜
2
(1 + ǫ1)
]
E
∫ δc
0
∣∣∣Z(1)s − Z(2)s ∣∣∣2 ds
}
+
b˜2
ǫ2
δc sup
t≤δc
∣∣∣Y¯ (1)t − Y¯ (2)t ∣∣∣
≤ C(ǫ1, ǫ2, δc)‖(Y (1), Z(1))− (Y (2), Z(2))‖2N [0,δc]
for C(ǫ1, ǫ2, δc) = max
{
e
1
ǫ2
δcb˜
2
[
ǫ2 + L
2
ae
1
ǫ1
δc b˜
2
(1 + ǫ1)
]
, b˜
2
ǫ2
}
.
Denote C(ǫi) = e
1
ǫi
δcb˜
2
. By choosing
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 2δcb˜
2,
we have
C(ǫ1) = C(ǫ2) =
1
2
.
Therefore,
C(ǫ1, ǫ2, δc) = max
{
e
1
2
(
ǫ2 + L
2
ae
1
2
)
(1 + ǫ1),
1
2
}
≤ max
{
L2ae+ e
1
2 ǫ2 + L
2
aeǫ1 + e
1
2 ǫ1ǫ2,
1
2
}
< 1.
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for δc small enough by condition (2).
By the contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique fixed point (Y, Z) for T . In fact,
(Y, Z) ∈ N [0, δc]. Let X be the corresponding solution to the SDE (4.6), (X,Y, Z) ∈ S2δc(RN ) ×
S2δc(R
N )×H2δc(RN,d) is a unique adapted solution of (4.9) with forward process (4.6).
We next show that a unique solution exists for the problem with an arbitrary time horizon T > 0
by a pasting method. The argument requires the construction of a decoupling random field, which
will be identified with the Y component in the FBSDE solution.
To this end, denote Θ := (X,Y ,Z), and consider a FBSDE on a subinterval [t1, t2]:
Xt = η¯ +
∫ t
t1
g(s,Θs)ds+
∫ t1
t
σ(s,Θs)dζs,(4.11)
Yt = φ(Xt2)−
∫ t2
t
f(s,Θs)ds−
∫ t2
t
Zsdζs, t ∈ [t1, t2].(4.12)
where η¯ ∈ L2(Ft1) and φ(x, ·) ∈ L2(Ft2), for each fixed x. In the Markovian case and if σ(t, ·)
is independent of Z, the solution Yt = u(t,Xt) is a (viscosity) solution to a quasilinear PDE. For
non-Markovian case as in the present setting, the solution Yt is a random function of the stochastic
process. This correspondence provides intuition to the following definition that is standard in the
literature ([34]).
Definition 2. A decoupling field of FBSDE (3.11) is an F-progressively measurable random field
u : [0, T ] × R × Ω 7→ R with u(T, x) = h(x) if there exists a constant δh > 0 such that, for any
0 = t1 < t2 ≤ T with t2 − t1 ≤ δc and any η¯ ∈ L2(Ft1), the FBSDE ((4.11) - (4.12)) with initial
value η¯ and terminal condition u(t2, ·) has a unique solution that satisfies Yt = u(t,Xt) for t ∈ [0, T ].
Such decoupling field u is called regular if it is uniformly Lipschitz in the spacial variable x.
To construct a regular decoupling field, we look at a variational FBSDE. Omitting the subscript
t, fix processes Y (1), Y (2), X(1), X(2) ∈ [0, T ] × RN . The initial conditions for X(1), X(2) are x(1)
and x(2), respectively. Let i and j be the indices for vector components.
Define the operator ∇¯ : ([0, T ]× RN )2 → [0, T ]× RN×N as
(∇¯Y )i,j :=


Y
(1)
i −Y
(2)
i
x
(1)
j −x
(2)
j
if x
(1)
j 6= x(2)j ,
0 if x
(1)
j = x
(2)
j .
for i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. The operator ∇¯ on a constant vector is defined similarly.
We next show the FBSDE in ∇¯X , ∇¯Y and ∇¯Z has a unique solution that is in fact a constant.
This solution leads to a decoupling field associated to the original FBSDE. Then by a pasting
argument, the FBSDE has a unique solution on an arbitrary time interval [0, T ].
By equation (4.2) and (4.3), and let z1, z2 denote arbitrary vectors in R
N , we have
g(t, z1)− g(t, z2)
z1 − z2 = bt,(4.13)
σ(t, z1)− σ(t, z2)
z1 − z2 = 1.(4.14)
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We can compute
X(1) −X(2) = x(1) − x(2) +
∫ t
0
g(1) − g(2)
Z(1) − Z(2)
(
Z(1) − Z(2)
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σ1 − σ2
Z(1) − Z(2) (Z
(1) − Z(2))dζs,
(4.15)
Y (1) − Y (2) = A(X(1)T −X(2)T )−
∫ T
t
f (1) − f (2)
Z(1) − Z(2) (Z
(1) − Z(2))ds−
∫ T
t
(Z(1) − Z(2))dζs.
(4.16)
It can be verified that (4.15) - (4.16) imply that the processes ∇¯X , ∇¯Y and ∇¯Z satisfy the
following FBSDE
∇¯X = ∇¯x+
∫ t
0
bs∇¯Zsds+
∫ t
0
∇¯Zsdζs,(4.17)
∇¯Y = A∇¯XT −
∫ T
t
bs∇¯Zsds−
∫ T
t
∇¯Zsdζs.(4.18)
A solution to the above FBSDE is (∇¯X, ∇¯Y, ∇¯Z)t∈[0,T ] = (∇¯x,A∇¯x, 0)t∈[0,T ].
Similarly, define
(4.19) (∇¯u(t))i,j = u
i(t,X
(1)
t )− ui(t,X(2)t )
X
(1),j
t −X(2),jt
,
we must have
∇¯u(t) = ∇¯Yt(∇¯Xt)−1 = A.
The random field u(t, x) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in the spacial variable. Hence it is
regular.
Let δc > 0 be small enough so that the FBSDE (3.11) admits a unique solution Θ ∈ L2 for
t ≤ δc. For any (t, x), denote the (unique) solution to FBSDE (3.11) starting from (t, x) by Θt,x,
and denote a random field by u(t, x) = Y t,xt . The uniqueness of solution to FBSDE then leads to
that Y t,xs = u(s,X
t,x
s ), for s ∈ [t, T ], P-a.s.
Let 0 = t0 < ... < tn = T be a partition of [0, T ] such that ti − ti−1 ≤ δc, i − 1, ..., n. We
first consider the FBSDE (3.11) on [tn−1, tn]. By existence of solution on a small interval, there
exists a process Y
tn−1,x
t , for x = Xtn−1 and hence a random field u(t, x) for t ∈ [tn−1, tn] such
that ∇¯u(t) = A for all t ∈ [tn−1, tn]. Next, consider FBSDE (3.11) on [tn−2, tn−1] with terminal
condition u(tn−1, ·). Apply the results on solution on small interval, we find u on [tn−2, tn−1] such
that ∇¯u(t) = A for t ∈ [tn−2, tn−1]. Repeating this procedure backward n times, we extend the
random field u to the whole interval [0, T ].
We now show the solution obtained in this way is in the right space.
Define
I20 := E


(∫ T
0
(|g|+ |f |)(s, 0)ds
)2
+
∫ T
0
|σ(s, 0)|2ds


≤
(
E
∫ T
0
|bs|2ds
)2
+ E
∫ T
0
|bs|2ds
≤ T 2b˜4 + T b˜2 <∞.
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By |u(t, x)| ≤ |u(t, 0)|+ |x|, considering the FBSDE on each interval [ti, ti+1] with initial value
Xti = 0, we see that there exists a constant C such that
(4.20) E|u(ti, 0)|2 = E
∣∣∣Y ti,0ti ∣∣∣2 ≤ C(E|u(ti+1, 0)|2 + E∣∣Xti+1∣∣2)+ CI20 .
Since u(tn, 0) = 0, we have
(4.21) max
0≤i≤n
E|u(ti, 0)|2 ≤ CI20 .
A standard estimation using the forward and backward dynamics and the bounds for the coeffi-
cients yields,
E
{
sup
ti≤t≤ti+1
(
|Xt|2 + |Yt|2
)
+
∫ ti+1
ti
|Zs|2ds
}
≤ CE
[
|Xti |2 +
∣∣u(ti+1, 0)∣∣2]+ CI20
(4.22)
To estimate |Xti |2, notice that (4.22) and (4.20) imply that
E|Xti+1 |2 ≤ CE
[
|Xti |2 + |u(ti+1, 0)|2
]
+ CI20 ≤ CE|Xti |2 + CI20 .
Therefore,
E
{
sup
0≤t≤T
(
|Xt|2 +|Yt|2
)
+
∫ T
0
|Zs|2 ds
}
≤ C
(
|x|2 + I20
)
.
(4.23)

Remark 5. The proof relies crucially on the boundedness of (bt)t∈[0,T ], or equivalently, of the return
rate (ht)t∈[0,T ]. The case where ht is an unbounded stochastic process is still open and it is left for
future research.
5. Deep learning algorithms
In this section, we will give a brief introduction to the deep neural network that will be used in
our numerical scheme.
5.1. The neural network as function approximators. Neural networks are compositions of
simple functions. They are efficient in approximating the solutions of (stochastic) differential equa-
tions. To obtain a good approximator, it usually requires the algorithm to find the best parameters
in the function composition, which, in many cases, is convenient by the method of SGD.
We adopt notations from [? ] and consider simple feedforward neural networks (NNs). Denote
the dimension of state variable x by dx. Fix a input dimension dI = dx if the approximated function
is only in the variable x. We may take time t as an additional input parameter to enable parameter
sharing across time steps. In this case, the solution at all time steps is modeled by a single neural
network and the function will depend on (t, x) and dI = dx+1. We denote the output dimension by
dO, and dO = N for N the dimension of the FBSDE solution. There are total number of L+1 ∈ N,
L ≥ 2 layers for each NN, with ml, l ∈ {0, ..., L}, the number of neurons in each hidden layer. For
simplicity, we choose ml = m for l ∈ {1, ..., L− 1}.
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More specifically, the fully connected feedforward neural network for the FBSDE solver is a
function from Rd
I
to Rd
O
defined by the composition map
x 7→ PL · ϕ · PL−1 · ... · ϕ · P1(x) := f(x) ∈ RN .
for x ∈ RdI . Here, Pl, l ∈ {1, ..., L} are affine functions with assigned input and output dimensions.
To be specifical on the structure of Al,
Pl(x) = wlx+ bl, l ∈ {1, ..., L}.
The matrix wl and vector bl is the weight and bias of a hidden layer, respectively. ϕ : R→ R is the
activation function, which is a nonlinear function that can be customized. Some standard activation
functions are tanh, Softmax, Sigmoid, and ReLU. For all our experiments, we use ReLU(x) =
max{0, x} as the activation function for the fully connected networks.
Denote the parameters of the neural network by θ ∈ RNθ , which includes all the matrices wl and
vectors bl. Let Nθ(m) =
∑L−1
l=0 ml(1 +ml+1) = d
I(1 +m) +m(1 +m)(L− 1) +m(1 +N). Denote
Θm the set of possible parameters with m hidden units.
The neural network that satisfies the given input and output dimension, the number of layers,
and with the nonlinear function ϕ is in the function space
NNϕ
dI ,dO,L
= ∪
m∈N
NNϕ
dI ,N,L,m
(Θm) = ∪
m∈N
NNϕ
dI ,N,L,m
(RNθ(m))
By a learnable variable, we mean any variable that is needed to compute the value of the loss
function and can be optimized, other than the parameters in the above functional form of neural
networks.
5.1.1. The recurrent neural network. We will use the recurrent neural network for the network-
based estimation step, and we introduce it here. Denote the weights and bias parameters similar
as before. Let ϕ denote the activation function. the details network structure is as follows. For a
time series sequence x = (x0, ..., xt, ..., xT ), we compute the hidden state at time t, Ht inductively
by
Ht = ϕ(witxt + bit + whtHt−1 + bht),(5.1)
ft = ϕ(wtHt + bt), t ∈ {0, ..., T }.(5.2)
where the subscript it denotes the weight and bias for input at time t and the subscript ht indicates
the weight and bias for the hidden state at time t < T . The parameters wt and bt denotes the
weight and bias of the linear map for the time t hidden state. The RNN structure we use for Stage
I estimation is exactly this one, with xt being the stock price at time t.
5.2. Deep Learning Scheme. We perform the deep learning scheme on several independent mod-
els. Each model corresponds to a particular market setting. HM indicates the homogeneous initial
belief, HT for the heterogeneous initial belief, PI for partial information, FI for full information.
L for the case of linear Gaussian filter. NL for nonlinear filter. C for game with competition, and
NC for no competition.
We use the uniform time discretization for interval [0, T ]. Let 0 = t0 < ... < tK = T be
such that ∆t = tk − tk−1, k ∈ {1, ...,K}. The conditional expectation in the previous section is
a function of stock prices and the initial belief that best approximates the conditioned variable
in the least square sense. The deep learning scheme is performed in two stages. In Stage I, we
approximate the conditional expectation of the mean stock return as a function of the hidden
variable, ht = h(At) on FSt . The hidden state Ht computed by the feed-forward neural network
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depends the past stock prices up to time t, as well as the initial prior of the investor’s estimate on
the market return. Therefore, so does the approximated estimation of the investor, hˆ at time t.
We optimize E = 3 independent networks in parallel and take the average of network outputs to
get a single agent’s estimation. The variance reduction technique of averaging random outcomes
is common in the classical Monte Carlo method. Let Gk be the neural network approximation of
conditional expectation at time step k. The input variable is the all the asset prices at discrete
time steps, including that at time 0, and the investor’s initial prior. Hence, dI,K = d(K + 1) + 1
where d is the number of stocks and K is the maximal time step index. Let G ∈ RnnϕdI,K ,N,m=64,
and Gk be the k-th output in the sequential order that depends on information up to time tk. For
mini-batch of size B, the loss function for Stage I is
LossI =
1
B
1
K + 1
B∑
j=1
K∑
k=0
‖Gk(S(j)·∧tk , Aˆ(j)0 )− h(j)k (Aˆ(j)0 )‖2
where S
(j)
·∧tk denotes the stock prices up to time tk, and h
(j)
k (Aˆ
(j)
0 ) indicates the j-th simulated
stock return from the investor’s subjective probability measure Pi mainly caused by different initial
beliefs. Suppose G∗,(e) is the trained model for the e-th independent network, the estimation of the
stock return at time tk given the stock price path S and initial estimate Aˆ0 is
hˆk =
1
E
E∑
e=1
G∗,(e)k (S·∧tk , Aˆ0).
In Stage II, we use neural networks to approximate the solution (Xt, Yt, Zt), t ∈ [0, T ] of the
FBSDE. Let Yˆ0 be learnable variables that will be optimized by the SGD. Xˆ0 = x. First, define
the vector h by (hk)i = h
i
k where h
i
k is the agent i’s estimation of return at time tk. The network
input is (hˆk, Sk, tk), which is a vector consisting the value of estimated returns, the stock prices
and a time variable. Let dI = 2dN + 1 := dS (S for Solver) for d the number of stocks as before,
GS ∈ NNdS ,N,3, hˆk, Sk ∈ Rd. Compute Yˆk+1 from Yˆk by (omitting index j for j ∈ {1, ..., B})
Yˆk+1 = Yˆk + Zˆk∆ζk + f(hˆk, Zˆk)∆t,
and Xˆk+1 from Xˆk by
Xˆk+1 = Xˆk +

Zˆk hˆk
σ
+
1
α
∣∣∣∣∣ hˆkσ
∣∣∣∣∣
2

∆t+
(
Zˆk +
1
α
hˆk
σ
)
∆ζk.
where Zˆk = GS(hˆk, Sk, tk), until k = K. The loss function is
LossII =
1
B
B∑
j=1
‖Yˆ (j)K −AXˆ(j)K ‖2.
We use a single layer recurrent neural network (RNN) with hidden units m = 64 for Stage I,
the estimation step. The choice of network structure utilizes the time series nature of the input
variable, and at the same time to reduce computational complexity. Due to the path dependence of
the estimation, the estimate hˆk at different times require neural network approximators of varying
input dimension, if without the RNN. The RNN takes the sequence of stock prices indexed by
time as input and outputs a sequence of hidden states indexed by time. Each element of the output
sequence depends on the data up to the index time. We then transform each hidden state by a linear
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map to obtain the estimation of return at the corresponding time. The loss is the mean square
error (MSE) of the estimate against the true return. To minimize the effort of hyperparameter
tuning that gives no structural changes, we use the default activation function from the pytorch
RNN module and let ϕ = tanh.
For Stage II, we use networks with L = 3 layers and m = 64 hidden units for GS . We use
the Adam optimizer in both stages. The initial rate for Stage I is lr = 1e−3 and we use learning
rate decay and half the learning rate every epdecay = 400 steps. The learning rate for Stage II is
lr = 3e−3, which is a standard choice for solving the BSDEs. Learning rates on the same scale
produce similar results. We include a comparison of the same deep learning scheme with different
learning rates in the appendix. As mentioned in the previous section, we use ReLU as the activation
function for the fully connected network in the FBSDE solver.
The training proceeds with eptrain = 5000 epochs for Stage I, followed by eptrain = 5000 epochs
for Stage II. Mini-batch size is B = 64 for both stages. The deep learning scheme is efficient and
robust across different sets of hyperparameters. We use deeper networks on Stage I compared to
that of Stage II because of the path dependence nature of the estimation problem. Since the network
is long, fewer hidden units in each layer are needed to achieve the same complexity of the function
approximator. In all the numerical experiments, we fix the investment horizon T = 0.5 year. The
CPU time for Stage II (FBSDE solver) of the parameter set (η, µ¯) = (0.02, 0), with 5000 training
epochs is 468s ≈ 8mins on a MacBook Pro with the 2.2 GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i7 processor.
6. Numerical results and model implications
Although the solution to the PDE is in an analytic form, we still need to compute the values of
integrals by numerical integrations. In this section, we present the solution to the HJB equation,
as well as the numerical solution by solving the multi-dimensional FBSDE (3.11) using the deep
learning method. We compare results from both methods in case of linear filters when PDE solutions
are available. We further apply the deep learning scheme on FBSDEs when nonlinear filters are
used to obtain the estimate of return rate. When the estimated return hˆt is bounded, the solution
to the FBSDE is unique. The deep learning solution converges to the unique Nash equilibrium.
When the return process is not necessarily bounded, which in our case, can be a CIR process for
the hidden variable At and a square root relation between the mean return and the hidden variable,
we do not have theoretical results on the uniqueness of the solution. However, we can still apply
the numerical method to find an equilibrium strategy.
6.1. Linear filter: homogeneous initial belief. In this section, we assume the investor’s initial
estimate is accurate, i.e, Σˆ(0) = 0. Denote ∆Wtk = Wtk+1 −Wtk and ∆Btk = Btk+1 − Btk . By
dynamics (3.21) - (3.20), generate sample paths of stock prices by
Atk+1 = Atk − λ(Atk − µ¯)∆t+ σµ∆Btk ,(6.1)
Stk+1 − Stk
Stk
= Atk∆t+ σS
(√
1− ρ2∆Wtk + ρ∆Btk
)
, k ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}.(6.2)
Set the base market parameters for the case of linear filters to be
(6.3) λ = 8, σS = 0.15, σµ = 0.3, ρ = −0.8,
where we allow the initial condition for h0 = h(A0) vary, as well as the µ¯ vary for different experi-
ments. We specify the cases later when presenting the correponding investment strategies.
The risk preference parameters are shown in Table 2.
RELATIVE WEALTH CONCERNS WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION AND HETEROGENEOUS PRIORS 23
Case δ1 δ2 δ3 θ1 θ2 θ3
NC 2 3 5 0 0 0
C 2 3 5 0.2 0.5 0.2
Table 2. Investors’ risk parameters with or without competition. Case C indicates
investment under wealth competition, and NC indicates the standard CARA utility
case.
To illustrate the investor’s estimated return process, we plot the sample path of estimates from
the RNN structure in Figure 1, together with the true return process. The estimate is the average
of three independent RNN network approximates. Consistent with standard results from filtering
theory, the estimates exhibits a trend that is similar to to the true process but with a time lag.
The values of the estimate process are less extreme due to the effect of estimation.
Table 3 is a comparison of the the deep learning results to the benchmark solutions from the
PDE method. Both the initial positions and the value functions are accurate for the experimented
parameter sets. The largest relative error of the initial position is (5.82 − 5.58)/5.58 = 4.3%. All
the absolute errors are less than 0.2 with one exception smaller than 0.25. The initial values are
accurate to the 2nd significant digit, and the maximal relative error in the value is less than 0.5%.
Figure 2 exhibits sample path strategies and the wealth processes of the agents. The portfolios
were solved for the same three agents as in the previous experiments in all the subfigures. For a
clear layout, we only plot the investment strategy πt of Agent 1 and Agent 3, and omit Agent 2 in
the first row. In the second row, the wealth processes for all three agents are shown. In the first
row, the black dash-dot line indicates the Merton strategy under the competition case, that is, the
strategy by assuming deterministic return process, which strategy can be solved as in [30]. The
difference between the investment strategy and the Merton strategy is the hedging demand of the
investor under competition utility. The hedging demand vanishes as time approachs the end of the
investment horizon, regardless of the market or risk parameters.
Table 4 shows the statistics of investment strategies for all three investors under different market
parameters and risk preferences. Each mean and standard derivation the empirical statistics of
B = 64 sample paths. The point here is not to estimate the true time series mean and std using
Monte Carlo method, but to illustrate the distribution of strategies, hence a sample size the same
as the training mini-batch size is used. We compute the CV (coefficient of variation) as the ratio
of the std and the mean, or the std per unit of the mean, as an additional indicator for the time
series volatility of strategies, and we report the average of CVs for the three investors in the table.
Investors’ strategies are more volatile under full information by observing the std and the CV.
However, the CV for the first set of market parameter indicates that the variation per unit of the
mean may increase under the partial information setting. Competition does not have a significant
effect on the CVs for the three test market parameters, indicating that standard deviation increase
mostly due to the increase of the strategy in term of absolute value.
Table 5 reports the empirical Sharpe ratio and the VRR, which is defined as the mean return
over variance, instead of over the std, following [19]. We also report the Sharpe ratio and the
VRR by viewing the three agents portfolio as the social portfolio. In the current experiments, the
mean reverting (µ¯ = 0, 0.02) level is quite low, since we take a conservative view of the market,
which causes both the Sharpe and VRR to be small. For the first set of parameters (the top
panel), small variation in the portfolio returns compensates for the inaccurate of return estimates,
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Figure 1. Sample paths of the estimated return versus the real market return
for the linear Gaussian return dynamics with process parameters specified in (6.3).
Black dashed line indicates the average of 3 independent neural network approxi-
mations. h0 = 0.05, µ¯ = 0.02, and the blue dashed line indicates the true return.
The initial estimate is a constant that equals to the true raturn rate, i.e, hˆ0 = 0.05.
x-axis indicates time. y-axis is the stock return rate.
η µ¯ Equation Initial position V (0)
0.02 0 PDE (2.8736, 5.2312, 5.8239) (−0.01773,−0.1829,−0.1955)
FBSDE (2.7492, 5.1297, 5.5849) (−0.01779,−0.1831,−0.1957)
0.05 0.02 PDE (7.4893, 13.6344, 15.1836) (−0.01760,−0.1815,−0.1937)
FBSDE (7.3917, 13.4794, 14.9981) (−0.01759,−0.1814,−0.1939)
0.1 0.02 PDE (14.6734, 26.7123, 29.7434) (−0.01740,−0.1796,−0.1912)
FBSDE (14.7277, 26.9211, 29.8841) (−0.01730,−0.1783,−0.1907)
Table 3. The investors’ initial positions and values of investment obtained from
solving the PDEs and the FBSDEs. The top, middle and bottom panels shows
solution under 3 different market environment with different initial return and
mean-reverting level. The investors’ initial prior is a constant equal to the market
true return rate.
resulting in the larger Sharpe and VRR in the case PI compared to the case FI , for all three agents.
Comparing the portfolio performances for the C and NC case under partial information, whether
competition increases or decreases the Sharpe and VRR depends on the interaction of market and
investors’ parameters. We leave it as future research to find the condition of the parameters and
risk preferences that induces each case.
6.2. Linear filter: heterogenous prior beliefs. Recall the estimated return of Agent i is given
by Ei
[
h(t)|FS ∨ Aˆi0
]
, where Ei indicates expectation under the subjective probability measure Pi
of Agent i. In both deep learning stages, we need to generate sample paths of ht under those
probability measures. The initial beliefs in the hidden variable Aˆ0 are sampled from a normal
distribution of N(mi, vi), i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Notice that vi = Σˆi(0).
To focus on the variation in the estimates’ accuracy, we assume the means of estimates are the
same for all 3 agents and let the standard deviation vary. The mean is equal to the true return
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Figure 2. Sample paths of the dollar amount invested in the stock for Agent 1 and
Agent 3, as well as the wealth processes Xt for all three agents. The left column
corresponds to investors’ response when the market parameters are h0 = 0.02,
µ¯ = 0. The middle column corresponds to the investors’ response when the market
has h0 = 0.05, µ¯ = 0.02. And the right column corresponds to the strategies and
wealth processes for investors’ when the true market parameters are h0 = 0.1 with
µ¯ = 0.02.
rate. More specifically, the parameters for initial estimates are
(6.4) (m1, std1) = (0.05, 0.05), (m2, std2) = (0.05, 0.1), (m3, std3) = (0.05, 0),
where the Agent 3 has the accurate estimate.
To generate sample paths under the subjective probability measure, we first sample Aˆi from the
prescribed distribution, then proceed as follows:
Aˆitk+1 = Aˆ
i
tk − λ(Aˆitk − µ¯)∆t+ σa∆Btk , k ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}.(6.5)
The above equation requires simulation of ∆B. To obtain the stock prices in P, we next simulate
∆W . Let A0 be the accurate market return, we simulate according to (6.1) and (6.2) to get the
stock prices Stk in the objective world. The estimation is the projection on the subjection view Aˆ
i.
The hidden state of the recurrent network GS at time tk depends on the stock path up to time
tk, as well as Aˆ0. To get the return estimates for investor i, we then optimize the NNs by SGD
on the mean square loss of the NN outputs against the subjective hidden state Aˆi. The estimated
return is the output of Stage I. The estimation is a part of the neural network input at Stage II for
solving the FBSDE.
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Mean of (abs. value) strategies Std of (abs. value) strategies CV Ratio of CV
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Mean PI / FI C / NC
NC-FI 5.360 8.044 13.402 3.507 5.264 8.776 0.654
NC-PI 3.562 5.345 8.908 2.422 3.630 6.056 0.680 1.038
C-PI 4.994 9.103 10.077 3.305 6.022 6.674 0.662 0.974
NC-FI 5.763 8.647 14.397 3.726 5.590 9.311 0.647
NC-PI 4.315 6.472 10.786 2.516 3.777 6.291 0.583 0.902
C-PI 6.436 11.723 12.983 3.720 6.775 7.497 0.578 0.991
NC-FI 6.562 9.835 16.394 4.070 6.103 10.175 0.620
NC-PI 5.475 8.211 13.687 3.023 4.538 7.565 0.553 0.890
C-PI 7.707 14.037 15.542 4.446 8.096 8.966 0.577 1.044
Table 4. Time series mean and standard deviation of the three agents’s absolute
value of investment strategies under different market parameter sets for the linear
Gaussian case. The return dynamic is given by ((6.2) - (6.1)) and parameters
are given by (6.3). The CV (coefficient of variation) is the time series standard
deviation per unit of the mean, i.e, CV = Std / mean. The ratio PI / FI is the
ratio of the CVs of the case PI-NC and the FI-NC. The ratio C / NC is the ratio of
CVs of the case PI-C and PI-NC. The top, middle and bottom panel corresponds
to the case (h0, µ¯) equals to (0.02, 0), (0.05, 0.02) and (0.1, 0.02), respectively. The
investor’s initial belief is equal to the true return for all cases.
Sharpe ratio VRR
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Social Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Social
NC-FI 0.03690 0.03695 0.03677 0.008369 0.06130 0.04091 0.02441 0.002779
NC-PI 0.04776 0.04802 0.04807 0.01357 0.1267 0.08520 0.05124 0.007223
C-PI 0.04645 0.04654 0.04651 0.01182 0.08331 0.04583 0.04138 0.004382
NC-FI 0.06655 0.06617 0.06613 0.01889 0.1448 0.09614 0.05757 0.008226
NC-PI 0.05290 0.05285 0.05280 0.01523 0.1497 0.09974 0.05987 0.008628
C-PI 0.02738 0.02743 0.02705 0.002783 0.03355 0.01846 0.01639 0.000704
NC-FI 0.06192 0.06171 0.06189 0.01639 0.10203 0.06771 0.04078 0.005400
NC-PI 0.02417 0.02406 0.02418 0.003781 0.04106 0.02723 0.01642 0.001284
C-PI 0.03884 0.03888 0.03904 0.007006 0.04524 0.02485 0.02252 0.001685
Table 5. The empirical Sharpe ratio and VRR for each agent as well as the total
wealth of agents (social wealth). The top panel (row 1 - 3) corresponds to the
market parameters with initial return rate 0.02 and mean reverting to 0. The
middle panel (row 4 - 6) corresponds to initial return 0.05 and mean reverting level
0.02. The bottom panel (row 7 - 9) is for different information setting when the
initial market return is 0.1, with mean-reverting to 0.02. In each market setting,
the investors have the initial belief that is a constant equals to the true market
return rate.
To facilitate the comparison, the numerical results for this section in both the case with and
without competition, C and NC, respectively, are shown in the later section together with the
heterogeneous agents case with nonlinear returns.
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6.3. Nonlinear filter. The linear relation between the return rate and stock fundamentals allows
us to obtain an explicit solution. However, the assumption is restrictive and unrealistic. To find
an investment strategy that is useful in practice, or to derive relevant asset pricing implications
from the investment strategies, we need to consider the case of nonlinear h. For the numerical
experiments, we focus on the following stock and hidden state dynamics:
dSt
St
= c · sign(At)
√
|At|dt+
√
1− ρ2σSdWt + ρσSdBt (observed),(6.6)
dAt = −λ(At − µ¯)dt+ σa
√
(At − al)(au −At)dBt (hidden)(6.7)
for λ, c, al, au ∈ R.
The numerical scheme for solving the equilibrium investment strategy and value functions is
similar to the one with linear filters. The difference is that simulations of Aˆit and At are according
to the discretized equation for the above dynamics instead of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (6.2)
- (6.1).
We next present numerical results in cases of nonlinear filters for heterogeneous market investors
with parameters in (6.4). The base market parameters for (6.7) - (6.6) are
(6.8) c = 0.25, ρ = −0.8, σS = 0.15, λ = 1, σa = 0.4, al = −0.3, au = 0.3.
Similar to the case of linear Gaussian return, Figure 3 shows sample path strategies and the
wealth processes of the agents. The black dash-dotted line in the first row of the figure is the Merton
strategy that assumes the return is a deterministic process, which we use as the benchmark. And
the difference between the real strategies and the benchmark is the hedging demand for stochastic
returns. As time approaches the end of the investment horizon, the hedging demand vanishes.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of competition. The subfigures are the investment strategies for all
the three agents. Each subfigure includes the strategy for an investor in case of with and without
relative concerns, C and NC. The horizontal line indicates the time series mean of strategies in the
C and NC case. In case with competition, the weight parameters are 0.2, 0.5 and 0.2, respectively
for the three agents, and it is apparent from the figure that the change in Agent 2’s strategy is the
largest among the three investors, due to the largest competition weight factor.
Table 6 shows the time series statistics of investment strategies for all investors with different
market parameters and risk preferences under the nonlinear return dynamics. Both the mean and
Std are mean of the B = 64 sample path Means and Stds. The CV is defined similar as before as
the standard deviation per unit of the mean, and we report the mean of CVs for the three investors
in the table. We then calculate the changes in the CVs and report the ratio as an indicator to
the volatilities of the strategies. Under the nonlinear dynamics, the CVs for the first parameter
set is significantly smaller in the partial information case (PI), compared to the full information
case (FI). For other initial return rates and mean reverting levels, it is similar that the strategies
under PI is less volatile. Unlike the experimented cases of the linear filter, competition can decrease
the volatility of the strategies, since the ratio of CVs for C and NC for the last set of parameters,
(h0, µ¯) = (0.1, 0.02) is smaller than 1.
Table 7 reports the empirical Sharpe ratio and VRR, which is defined as the mean return over
variance. The Sharpe ratio is higher in the full information case for the first two sets of market
parameters, while for the last parameter set, the partial information case yields a higher Sharpe
ratio. Similarly for the VRRs. The standard deviation of wealth processes may be large in the
case of full information to the level that a high return could not compensate for, and thus induces
a smaller empirical Sharpe ratio in the FI case. Whether or not competition increases the return
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Figure 3. Sample paths of the dollar amount invested in the stock for Agent 1 and
Agent 3, as well as the wealth processesXt for all three agents when the return rate
dynamics is nonlinear. The left column corresponds to investors’ response when
the market parameters are h0 = 0.02, µ¯ = 0. The middle column corresponds to
the investors’ response when the market has h0 = 0.05, µ¯ = 0.02. And the right
column corresponds to the strategies and wealth processes for investors’ when the
true market parameters are h0 = 0.1 with µ¯ = 0.02.
of portfolio per unit of risk also may depend on the specification of risk preference and market
parameters.
6.4. Heterogenous prior beliefs: the nonlinear filter and comparisons. We have described
the computation algorithm of the estimation step, Stage I in previous sections. The estimations
enter the FBSDE as state variables, and allow us to solve for the optimal investment strategies
under both the case with and without competition. Table 8 shows the times series mean and
standard derivations of the absolute value of investment strategies of the 3 agents. Similar as in
the previous sections, we report the mean of the time series statistics over a sample of size B = 64.
The bottom panel of 8 is the differences of the statistics between the linear and nonlinear case for
the set of market parameters that we specified.
The top panel shows that competition increases the investment proportion and its volatility,
since the ratio of the mean of the competition and no competition case is greater than 1 for all
agents both in the homogeneous and heterogeneous case. Similarly for the case with nonlinear
filters as it is shown in the middle panel. A key observation is the ratios are larger in the HT
case compared to the HM case for both linear and nonlinear return dynamics, which indicates that
investors increase their investment proportion in absolute value. In other words, Agent 1 and Agent
2 follow the strategy of Agent 3, who has the most aggressive strategy. Agent 3 also increases the
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Figure 4. Sample paths of investors’ strategies under nonlinear return rate dy-
namics. From the left to the right are the strategies for Agent 1, Agent 2 and Agent
3, respectively. The solid lines are strategies when investors are under competition.
The dash-dotted lines are the Merton strategies. The risk aversion parameters and
competition weights for both cases are specified in 2. The horizontal lines are the
averages of strategies across time for the plotted sample paths.
Mean of (abs. value) strategies Std of (abs. value) strategies CV Ratio of CV
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Mean PI / FI C / NC
NC-FI 5.386 8.078 13.461 3.671 5.494 9.163 0.681
NC-PI 3.024 4.540 7.566 1.625 2.438 4.063 0.537 0.789
C-PI 4.092 7.454 8.249 2.187 3.989 4.415 0.535 0.996
NC-FI 6.064 9.099 15.168 3.740 5.612 9.359 0.617
NC-PI 3.735 5.606 9.333 1.556 2.331 3.881 0.416 0.675
C-PI 5.507 10.039 11.098 2.397 4.367 4.833 0.435 1.046
NC-FI 6.865 10.293 17.146 4.022 6.027 10.044 0.586
NC-PI 5.100 7.645 12.741 1.845 2.773 4.615 0.362 0.618
C-PI 7.322 13.347 14.763 2.602 4.740 5.256 0.356 0.982
Table 6. Time series statistics of the three agents’ absolute value of investment
strategies under different market parameter sets for the nonlinear case. The return
dynamic is ((6.6) - (6.7)) and the parameter set is in (6.8). The CV (coefficient of
variation) is the time series standard deviation per unit of the mean, i.e, CV = Std
/ mean. Mean of CVs is the average of investors’ CVs. The ratio PI / FI is the
ratio of the (mean of) CVs of the case PI-NC and the FI-NC. The ratio C / NC is
the ratio of the (mean of) CVs of the case PI-C and PI-NC. The top, middle and
bottom panels correspond to the case (h0, µ¯) equals to (0.02, 0), (0.05, 0.02) and
(0.1, 0.02), respectively. The investor’s initial belief is equal to the true return for
all cases. Agents’ risk parameters are the base parameters.
investment proportion due to the aggregate effect of strategies of the other two and the competition
effect. Since Agent 3 has the most accurate prior, this further illustrates that the investor with the
most accurate information leads the investment strategy when market agents interact through the
relative wealth concern.
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Sharpe ratio VRR
Agent 0 Agent 1 Agent 2 Social Agent 0 Agent 1 Agent 2 Social
NC-FI 0.05613 0.05635 0.05642 0.01467 0.09359 0.06289 0.03782 0.004910
NC-PI 0.009739 0.009683 0.009705 0.001139 0.02871 0.01899 0.01145 0.0006710
C-PI 0.02875 0.02900 0.02873 0.006912 0.06703 0.03725 0.03315 0.003329
NC-FI 0.05903 0.05926 0.05933 0.01523 0.08997 0.06037 0.03626 0.004654
NC-PI 0.03445 0.03445 0.03440 0.009266 0.09866 0.06578 0.03945 0.005312
C-PI 0.01656 0.01658 0.01647 0.00113 0.02605 0.01432 0.01286 0.0003680
NC-FI 0.01569 0.01553 0.01557 -0.003970 0.01729 0.01139 0.006854 -0.0008700
NC-PI 0.03577 0.03571 0.03573 0.008800 0.07407 0.04918 0.02958 0.003641
C-PI 0.07469 0.07465 0.07486 0.02095 0.1460 0.08064 0.07303 0.008520
Table 7. The empirical Sharpe ratio and VRR for each agent as well as the social
wealth for nonlinear return rate dynamics. The top panel (row 1 - 3) corresponds
to the market parameters with initial return rate 0.02 and mean reverting to 0. The
middle panel (row 4 - 6) corresponds to initial return 0.05 and mean reverting level
0.02. The bottom panel (row 7 - 9) is for different information setting when the
initial market return is 0.1, with mean-reverting to 0.02. In each market setting,
the investors have the initial belief that is a constant equals to the true market
return rate. Agents’ risk parameters are the base parameters.
The bottom panel is the difference between the top and the middle panel, the case L minus
the case NL. The ratio is higher in the linear filter case, except for Agent 3 with heterogeneous
investors, where the competition effect is more pronounced for Agent 3 in the nonlinear case com-
pared to the linear case. Viewing the competition effect as an agent-market characteristics, the
cross-market difference varies more across agents in the HT case (the column C / NC in the bottom
panel). Therefore, partial information heterogeneity affects the sensitivity of the competition effect
to market characteristics, the return process in this particular case.
Notice that the information heterogeneity is only on the prior estimates. All agents follow the
Bayesian learning procedure with unlimited information processing ability. The effect of hetero-
geneity is already pronounced.
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Mean of (abs. value) strategies Std of (abs. value) strategies C / NC
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
L-HT NC-PI 4.262 6.689 10.581 3.661 6.191 8.953
C-PI 6.654 12.399 13.350 5.148 10.000 10.131 1.561 1.854 1.262
L-HM NC-PI 4.315 6.472 10.786 2.516 3.777 6.291
C-PI 6.436 11.723 12.983 3.720 6.775 7.497 1.492 1.811 1.204
NL-HT NC-PI 4.998 7.576 8.920 2.095 3.438 4.915
C-PI 7.402 13.426 12.043 2.992 6.084 5.991 1.481 1.772 1.350
NL-HM NC-PI 3.735 5.606 9.333 1.556 2.331 3.881
C-PI 5.507 10.039 11.098 2.397 4.367 4.833 1.474 1.791 1.189
Diff: HT NC-PI -0.735 -0.888 1.661 1.566 2.753 4.038
C-PI -0.748 -1.027 1.308 2.156 3.916 4.140 0.080 0.082 -0.088
Diff: HM NC-PI 0.580 0.866 1.453 0.960 1.445 2.410
C-PI 0.929 1.684 1.885 1.323 2.407 2.664 0.017 0.020 0.015
Table 8. The mean and standard deviation of absolute value of investment strate-
gies for investors with hetegogeneous initial beliefs, under both the linear and non-
linear return dynamics. L stands for linear filter, NL for nonlinear filter, HM
and HT stands for homogeneous and nonhomogeneous agents, respectively. In
each section of case L and NL, the first two rows show strategies for the hetero-
geneous beliefs, while we include the result from the homogeneous investors case
for comparison (the last two rows in each section). The base market parameter is
(h0, µ¯) = (0.05, 0.02). The heterogeneous investors have the initial estimation of
hˆ0 = h0, while differ in the variance parameters. For the linear case, the variances
are 0.05, 0.1 and 0, respectively for the 3 agents. For the nonlinear case, the initial
belief is drawn from a uniform distribution on a bounded interval that is with the
length 0.05, 0.1 and 0, respectively and centered at the mean h0. The bottom
panel is the difference of the Means and Stds of the L and NL cases from the top
and middle panel.
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7. Conclusion and further remarks
In this paper, we consider an N-agent game where the investors are utility maximizers. The in-
vestor’s utility function depends on the wealth amount she outperforms the market average. Market
investors can only observe the stock prices, but not the state that drives the drift. First, we establish
a fully-coupled forward backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) that characterizes the
N-agent investment decisions. For bounded return process, we show that the FBSDE solution is
unique. Therefore, for the linear Gaussian or bounded nonlinear returns , we have the existence and
uniqueness result of the FBSDE solution. Hence, there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the game.
The wellposedness of the FBSDE in the case of unbounded return process is not readily available,
because it requires higher moments estimation of the solution components to meet the coupling
condition. We leave it for future reseach. For the numerical scheme, we apply a novel deep learning
approach to the system of equations. We first apply deep-neural-network-based L2 projection to
obtain each investor’s estimation of the asset return, and then design a deep FBSDE solver to find
the value functions and the optimal controls simultaneously for all agents. The deep learning solu-
tion is compared to the PDE solution for the linear Gaussian return. The methodology developed
in this paper, both the theoretical results and the numerical methods have potential applications in
stochastic controls, stochastic games as well as in the mean field setting. Moreover, in the present
paper, the information heterogeneity is only on the prior estimates. All agents follow the Bayesian
learning procedure with uncounstrained information processing ability. The effect of heterogeneity
is already pronounced. The case with agents’ heterogeneity in information capacity and the cor-
responding asset pricing implications are promising reseach directions that will potentially lead to
fruitful insights.
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Appendices
7.1. Derivation of PDE solutions. When the return process is a linear function of (At)t∈[0,T ], we
follow the market model (3.20) and (3.21) and solve for the utility maximization problem using PDE
approach. The optimal control and value function can be characterized by HJB equation. When a
unique classical solution exists for the PDE, we can apply the Ito’s formula to verify the solution
is the value function of the control problem. The optimal control is obtained as a byproduct. We
now state the verification theorem for classical solutions.
Let w be a function in C1,2([0, T ]× RN ) solution to the HJB equation:
∂w
∂t
(t, x) + sup
a∈A
[Law(t, x) + f(x, a)] = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× RN ,
w(T, x) = g(x), x ∈ RN .
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Verification theorem. Suppose there exists a measurable function aˆ(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×RN ,
valued in A attaining the supremum, i.e.
sup
a∈A
[Law(t, x) + f(x, a)] = Laˆ(t,x)w(t, x) + f(x, aˆ(t, x)),
such that the SDE
dXu = b(Xu, aˆ(u,Xu))du + σ(Xu, aˆ(u,Xu))dWu
admits a unique solution denoted by Xˆt,xu , t ≤ u ≤ T , with the initial condition Xt = x, and the
process αˆ = {aˆ(u, Xˆt,xu ), t ≤ u ≤ T } lies in A, then w = v, and αˆ is an optimal feedback control.
Partial information HJB equation. For CARA utility, the solution V (t, x, y, η) is smooth.
Hence the classical verification theorem applies, which states that if the HJB equation has a smooth
solution, then the solution is the value function to the control problem. Let
V (t, x, y, η) = sup
π∈A
E
[
J(t)
∣∣Xt = x, X˜t = y, µˆt = η, Σˆ(t) = σ0].
Omitting the script i when there is no ambiguity. The agent i’s value function V (t, η, x, y) satistifes
the HJB equation,
Vt + sup
πt
{
πtηVx + α
−i
t ηVy − λ(η − µ¯)Vη +
1
2
π2t σ
2
SVxx +
1
2
(α−it )
2σ2SVyy
+
1
2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σS
)2
Vηη + α
−i
t πtσ
2
SVxy + πt
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
Vxη
+ α−it
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
Vyη
}
= 0,
with terminal condition V (T, x, y, η) = −e− 1δ ((1− θN )x−θy).
By the first order condition, the optimal πt is
π∗t = −
ηVx + α
−i
t σ
2
SVxy +
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
Vxη
σ2SVxx
.
Substitute π∗t into the above equation, we obtain the PDE for value function,
Vt + α
−i
t ηVy − λ(η − µ¯)Vη +
1
2
(α−it )
2σ2SVyy +
1
2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σS
)2
Vηη
−
(
ηVx + α
−i
t σ
2
SVxy + (Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ)Vxη
)2
2Vxxσ2S
= 0,
with terminal condition V (T, x, y, η) = −e− 1δ
(
(1− θN )x−θy
)
.
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Make an ansatz V (t, x, y, η) = −e− 1δ
(
(1− θN )x−θy
)
f(t, η). The PDE for f(t, η) is given by
ft + w2α
−i
t ηf − λ(η − µ¯)fη +
1
2
w22(α
−i
t )
2σ2Sf +
1
2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σS
)2
fηη
−
(
f + w2α
−i
t σ
2
Sf +
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
fη
)2
2σ2Sf
= 0
with f(T, η) = 1 and w2 =
θ
δ .
Further simplification gives
ft +

w2α−it η + 12w22(α−it )2σ2S −
(
η + w2α
−i
t σ
2
S
)2
2σ2S

f + 12
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σS
)2
fηη − λ(η − µ¯)fη
−
(
η + w2α
−i
t σ
2
S
)(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
σ2S
fη − 1
2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σS
)2
f2η
f
= 0,
with f(T ) = 1.
Set a transformation f(t, η) = eg(t,η), then g(t, η) satisfies the PDE,
gt +
1
2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σS
)2
gηη − λ(η − µ¯)gη −
(
η + w2α
−i
t σ
2
S
)(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
σ2S
gη
+ w2α
−i
t η +
1
2
w22(α
−i
t )
2σ2S −
(
η + w2α
−i
t σ
2
S
)2
2σ2S
= 0,
with g(T, η) = 0.
For the above PDE that is second order in the variable η, we make an ansatz that the solution
is quadratic in η with coefficients as an integral with respect to t:
g(t, η) =
∫ T
t
[
A(t, s)η2 +B(t, s)η + C(t, s)
]
ds
where A(t, s), B(t, s) and C(t, s) satisfy the following ODEs:
A˙− 2λA−
2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
σS
A = 0,
B˙ − λB − Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
σ2S
B + 2λµ¯A+ 2w2α
−i
t
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
A = 0,
C˙ +
(
Σ(t) + σSσµρ
)2
σ2S
A+ λµ¯B + w2α
−i
t
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
B = 0,
with A(t, t) = − 1
2σ2S
, B(t, t) = C(t, t) = 0.
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The solution to the ODE system is
A(t, s) = − 1
2σ2S
e
−2
∫
s
t
(
λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σS
)
du
,(7.1)
B(t, s) = l(t, s)e
−
∫
s
t
(
λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
du
,(7.2)
for
l(t, s) = − 1
σ2S
∫ s
t
(
λµ¯+ w2α
−i
t
(
Σˆ(u) + σSσµρ
))
e
−
∫
s
u
(
λ+
2(Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ)
σS
−
Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
dm
du,(7.3)
and
C(t, s) =
∫ s
t
(
(Σˆ(u) + σSσµρ)
2
σ2S
A(u, s) +
(
λµ¯+ w2α
−i
t (Σˆ(u) + σSσµρ)
)
B(u, s)
)
du.(7.4)
Moreover, the strategy π∗ is given by
π∗t =
δη +
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
δgη(t, T ) + α
−i
t σ
2
Sθ
σ2S(1− θN )
=
δ
σ2S(1− θN )
(
η +
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)∫ T
t
(
2A(t, s)η +B(t, s)
)
ds
)
+
θ
1− θN
α−it .
More explicitly,
π∗ =
δ
σ2S
(
1− θN
){η + (Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ)
∫ T
t
− 1
σ2S
e
−2
∫
s
t
(
λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σS
)
du
η
+
Σˆ(u) + σSσµρ
σ2S
∫ T
t
∫ s
t
λµ¯e
−
∫
s
u
(
λ+
2(Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ)
σS
−
Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
dm
du
e
−
∫
s
t
(
λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
du
ds
}
+
δ
σ2S(1− θN )
{
wi2
(
Σˆ(t) + σSσµρ
)
σ2S
∫ T
t
e
−
∫
s
t
(λ+
Σˆ(u)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)du
·
∫ s
t
(
Σˆ(u) + σSσµρ
)
e
−
∫
s
u
(
λ+
2(Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ)
σS
−
Σˆ(m)+σSσµρ
σ2
S
)
dm
duds+
θ
1− θN
}
α−it .
7.2. Appendix B. The deep learning results with respect to different learning rates are shown in
the figure below.
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Figure 5. The convergence of FBSDE solutions with respect to the training
epochs with different (constant without decay) learning rates. The top panel shows
the loss quantity, with the left two figures showing the loss in the ordinary scale
and the log scale, respectively. The right-most figure shows the loss for the last
2000 training epochs. The mid row is the initial Y values corresponding to the
components of the FBSDE solution in RN . From the left to the right, it is the
first, second and the third component, respectively. The last row shows the initial
investment amount for agent 1, agent 2 and agent 3, respectively from the left to
the right.
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